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Abstract
In this paper, we compute ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria in atomic splittable poly-
matroid congestion games with convex Lipschitz continuous cost functions. The main
approach relies on computing a pure Nash equilibrium for an associated integrally-
splittable congestion game, where players can only split their demand in integral multi-
ples of a common packet size. It is known that one can compute pure Nash equilibria for
integrally-splittable congestion games within a running time that is pseudo-polynomial
in the aggregated demand of the players. As the main contribution of this paper, we
decide for every ǫ ą 0, a packet size kǫ and prove that the associated kǫ-splittable Nash
equilibrium is an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium for the original game.
We further show that our result applies to multimarket oligopolies with decreasing,
concave Lipschitz continuous price functions and quadratic production costs: there is
a polynomial time transformation to atomic splittable polymatroid congestion games
implying that we can compute ǫ-approximate Cournot-Nash equilibria within pseudo-
polynomial time.
1 Introduction
Congestion games are a fundamental problem class in the operations research and algo-
rithmic game theory literature. They model equilibrium problems in transportation [15],
communication [16, 18] or logistics systems [5] and from a theoretical point of view, they are
frequently used as benchmark models for new concepts or algorithms. While by now, several
results regarding the existence and computability of equilibria are known (cf. [1, 4, 8, 9, 19]),
there is one particular subclass of congestion games, namely atomic splittable congestion
games, that is not well understood. In such game, there is set of resources and a set of
players, where each player is associated with a positive demand. In a simple symmetric
∗This work is part of the research programme Optimal Coordination Mechanisms for Distributed Resource
Allocation with project number 617.001.302, which is (partly) financed by the Netherlands Organisation
for Scientific Research (NWO).
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version, a strategy of every player is a (possibly fractional) distribution of the player-specific
demand over the resources. Resources have load-dependent, non-decreasing, and convex
costs and the total private cost of a player is simply the sum of player’s costs over the
resources. Even for this seemingly simple model, there are currently no efficient algorithms
computing (approximate) pure Nash equilibria known. 1
1.1 Related Work
Very recently (and independently of our work) Bhaskar and Lolakapuri [2] devised two
algorithms computing an ǫ-approximate equilibrium. Both algorithms run in exponential
time in either the number of resources or the number of players, respectively. They are are
based on guessing the marginal costs of the players at an equilibrium. These marginal cost
appear to have several monotonicity properties, which they exploit using a high-dimensional
binary search algorithm.
Harks and Timmermans [13] developed a polynomial time algorithm that computes exact
Nash equilibria when the cost functions are affine. Their idea is to compute a pure Nash
equilibrium for an associated integrally splittable congestion game. In such games, players
can only split their demand in integral multiples of a common packet size. The class of
integrally splittable singleton congestion games has been studied before by Tran-Thanh et
al. [20] for the case of player-independent convex cost functions. Later, this problem was
studied by Harks et al. [10, 11] for the more general case of polymatroid strategy spaces and
player-specific convex cost functions. In particular, Harks et al. proved that the algorithm
by Tran-Thanh et al. has a running time which is pseudo-polynomial in the aggregated
load of the players (cf. Corollary 5.2 [11]).
Deligkas et al. [6] study the computation of ǫ-approximate equilibria in general concave
games with compact strategy spaces and Lipschitz continuous cost functions. In their paper,
they decide on a number k, discretize the strategy space and only consider k-uniform points,
i.e., vectors where all elements are integer multiples of k. Then, as for each player only
finitely many of these vectors exist, they enumerate all feasible k-uniform strategy profiles,
and pick the best candidate (see also Lipton et al. [17] for a similar approach). This method
results in an algorithm that finds ǫ-approximate equilibria in exponential time.
1.2 Our Results
In this paper, we compute ǫ-approximate Nash equilibria for atomic splittable polymatroid
congestion games with non-decreasing, convex and Lipschitz continuous cost functions. In
such a game, the strategy space of every player is polymatroid base polytope which strictly
generalizes the singleton setting considered by Bhaskar and Lolakapuri [2]. Our main
approach – similar to the approach in [13] – relies on computing a pure Nash equilibrium
for an associated integrally splittable congestion game. We prove that for each ǫ ą 0, we
can compute a packet size kǫ that such that the kǫ-integral equilibrium is guaranteed to be
an ǫ-approximate equilibrium. Thus, this implies that one can compute an ǫ-approximate
equilibrium within pseudo-polynomial time by using the algorithm by Harks et al. [10, 11].
1See Definition 2.2 for the term “ǫ-approximate equilibrium”.
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In contrast to the algorithms of Bhaskar and Lolakapuri [2], our algorithm works even for
player-specific cost functions.
We further show that our result applies to multimarket oligopolies (cf. Bulow [3]) with
decreasing, concave Lipschitz continuous price functions and quadratic production costs.
We give a polynomial time transformation to atomic splittable congestions games with
player-specific convex costs, thus, our algorithm and the transformation can be used to
compute ǫ-approximate equilibria for multimarket oligopolies.
2 Preliminaries
Polymatroids. Let E “ te1, . . . , emu be a finite set of resources and ρ : 2
E Ñ R be (1)
submodular, i.e, ρpUq ` ρpV q ě ρpU Y V q ` ρpU X V q for all U, V Ď E, (2) monotone, i.e.,
ρpUq ď ρpV q for all U Ď V and (3) normalized, i.e, ρpHq “ 0. Then, the pair pE, ρq is
called a polymatroid and the associated polyhedron is defined as:
Pρ :“
 
x P REě0 | xpUq ď ρpUq @U Ď E
(
,
where xpUq :“
ř
ePU xe for all U Ď E. Given a polyhedron Pρ and a rational d P Qą0 with
d ď xpEq, a polymatroid base polytope of rank d is defined as:
Pρpdq :“
 
x P REě0 | xpUq ď ρpUq @U Ď E, xpEq “ d
(
.
Atomic splittable polymatroid congestion games. An atomic splittable polymatroid
congestion game is represented by the tuple: G :“ pN,E, pdiqiPN , pρiqiPN , pci,eqiPN,ePEq .
Here, N “ t1, . . . , nu is a finite player set and with every i P N , we associate a player-specific
polymatroid pE, ρiq. The strategy space of player i P N is defined as the (player-specific)
polymatroid base polytope
Pρipdiq :“
 
xi P R
E
ě0 | xipUq ď ρipUq @U Ď E, xipEq “ di
(
.
The combined strategy space is denoted by P :“
ś
iPN Pρipdiq and we denote by x “ pxiqiPN
the overall strategy profile. The entry xi,e of the vector xi is the load of player i on e P E
and xe :“
ř
iPN xi,e is defined as the total load on e. Resources have player-specific cost
functions ci,epxeq, where ci,epxeq is non-decreasing, non-negative, differentiable and convex.
We further assume that all cost functions ci,epxq and their derivatives c
1
i,epxq are Lipschitz
continuous:
Definition 2.1 (Lipschitz continuity). A function c : RÑ R is called Lipschitz continuous,
if there exists a constant L ą 0 such that for all x, y P R: |cpyq ´ cpxq| ď L|y ´ x|. Here L
is called the Lipschitz constant.
The total cost of player i in strategy distribution x is defined as πipxq “
ř
ePE ci,epxeqxi,e.
The goal of each player is to choose a strategy xi such that her personal cost πipxq is
minimized. As pure Nash equilibria in these games are not guaranteed to be rational, the
notion of ǫ-approximate equilibria are suitable.
Definition 2.2 (ǫ-approximate equilibrium). Strategy x is an ǫ-approximate equilibrium
for game G, if for each i P N , and every strategy yi P Pi: πipyi, x´iq ě πipxi, x´iq ´ ǫ.
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A pair
`
x, pyi, x´iq
˘
P P ˆ P is called an improving move of player i, if πipxi, x´iq ą
πipyi, x´iq. Given x´i P P´ipd´iq, a strategy xi P Pipdiq is called a best response of player
i to x´i if πipxi, x´iq ď πipyi, x´iq for all yi P Pipdiq.
When E,N, pρiqiPN and pci,eqiPN,ePE are clear from the context, we refer to the game as
GppdiqiPN q, and write Pipdiq instead of Pρipdiq. For each i P N , we write P´ipd´iq “ś
j‰iPjpdjq and x “ pxi, x´iq meaning that xi P Pipdiq and x´i P P´ipd´iq.
Integral Polymatroid Congestion Games. A k-integral polymatroid congestion game
is given by the tuple Gk :“ pN,E, pdiqiPN , pρiqiPN , pci,eqiPN,ePE , kq with k P Qą0 such that
di{k P N for all i P N . Here, players cannot choose any strategy in the polymatroid base
polytope, but only k-integral points. Thus, the strategy space of player i is defined by the
(player-specific) k-integral polymatroid base polytope:
P kρipdiq :“
 
xi P R
E
ě0 | xipUq ď ρipUq @U Ď E, xipEq “ di and xi,e “ kq, q P Ně0
(
.
When E,N, pρiqiPN and pci,eqiPN,ePE are clear from the context, we refer to the game as
GkppdiqiPN q and to the strategy spaces as P
k
i pdiq. Similar to atomic splittable congestion
games, the complete strategy space of the game is defined by Pk :“
ś
iPN P
k
i pdiq. For
i P N , we write Pk´ipd´iq “
ś
j‰i P
k
j pdjq and x “ pxi, x´iq meaning that xi P P
k
i pdiq and
x´i P P
k
´ipd´iq. A strategy profile x is an equilibrium if πipxq ď πipyi, x´iq for all i P N
and yi P P
k
i pdiq. A pair
`
x, pyi, x´iq
˘
P Pk ˆ Pk is called an improving move of player i,
if πipxi, x´iq ą πipyi, x´iq. Given x´i P P
k
´ipd´iq, a strategy xi P P
k
i pdiq is called a best
response of player i to x´i if πipxi, x´iq ď πipyi, x´iq for all yi P P
k
i pdiq.
Harks et al. [11] developed an algorithm that computes an exact Nash equilibrium for k-
integral splittable polymatroid congestion games with non-negative, increasing and convex
cost functions. The running time of this algorithm is pseudo-polynomial in the aggregated
demand of the players. Their algorithm [11, Algorithm 1] starts with an equilibrium for
the game where the demand for each player is set to zero: d1i “ 0. This game has a unique
equilibrium, where xi,e “ 0 for each i P N and e P E. Then, they repeatedly look for a
player for who d1i ă di. For this player, they increase d
1
i by k and a preliminary equilibrium
with respect to the current demands d1i is recomputed by following a sequence of best
responses of the players. The running time of [11, Algorithm 1] is Opnmpd{kq3q, where d
is an upper bound on the demands di.
3 Lipschitz Continuity and Approximate Equilibria
As our main result, we prove that when all cost functions and their derivatives are Lipschitz
continuous with Lipschitz constant L, we can compute a packet size kǫ such that the
exact kǫ-integral equilibrium is an ǫ-approximate atomic splittable equilibrium. Combined
with [11, Algorithm 1], this gives a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm computing an ǫ-
approximate equilibrium for atomic splittable polymatroid congestion games with convex
cost functions.
For preparing the necessary technical tools, in Section 3.1 we first discuss a sufficient and
necessary conditions for a strategy x to be either an atomic splittable equilibrium or a
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k-integral equilibrium. Then, in Section 3.2, we use these conditions to prove that for
any ǫ ą 0, we can find a packet size kǫ such that the exact kǫ-integral equilibrium is an
ǫ-approximate atomic splittable equilibrium.
3.1 Equilibrium Conditions in k-Integral Games
In atomic splittable congestion games, the marginal cost for player i on resource e is defined
as: µi,epxq “ ci,epxeq ` xi,ec
1
i,epxeq. Intuitively, it represents the cost increase of player i
when she would increase her load on resource e. For k-integral games, the marginal costs
are defined as follows:
µ`ki,e pxq “ pxi,e ` kqci,epxe ` kq ´ xi,eci,epxeq, (1)
µ´ki,e pxq “
#
xi,eci,epxeq ´ pxi,e ´ kqci,epxe ´ kq, if xi,e ą 0,
´8, if xi,e ď 0.
(2)
Here, µ`ki,e pxq is the cost for player i to add one packet of size k to resource e and µ
´k
i,e pxq
is the gain for player i for removing a packet of size k from resource e. When we apply
Theorem 8.1 [7] to k-integral games, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 3.1. Given an atomic splittable congestion game G, and a packet size k such
that ρipUq{k P N for all U Ď E and all i P N . Given a strategy x´i P P
k
´ipd´iq for k-
integral splittable game Gk, then strategy xi P P
k
i pdiq is a best response for player i if and
only if for every pair pe, fq P E2 the following holds. If there exist an α ą 0 such that:
xi ` αpχe ´ χf q P Pipdiq, then we have: µ
`k
i,e pxq ě µ
´k
i,f pxq.
Proof. Assume there exists an α ą 0 such that: xi ` αpχe ´ χf q P Pipdiq. Then, as
ρipUq{k P N for all U Ď E and all i P N , we can define α
1 “ kr 1
k
αs, for which holds that
xi ` α
1pχe ´ χf q P P
k
i pdiq. Then, Theorem 8.1 [7] implies that µ
`k
i,e pxq ě µ
´k
i,f pxq.
When the cost functions ci,epxq and their derivatives c
1
i,epxq are Lipschitz continuous with
Lipschitz constant L, we obtain the following relations between marginal costs in atomic
splittable games and k-integral games:
Lemma 3.2. For any feasible strategy x for game Gk, we have for each i P N and e P E:
1
k
µ`ki,e pxq ď µi,epxq ` kLpdi ` 1q and
1
k
µ´ki,e pxq ě µi,epxq ´ kLpdi ` 1q whenever xi,e ą 0.
Proof. We start by proving µ`ki,e pxq{k ď µi,epxq ` kLpdi ` 1q. We obtain:
µ`ki,e pxq{k “
pxi,e ` kqci,epxe ` kq ´ xi,eci,epxeq
k
“ xi,e
ci,epxe ` kq ´ ci,epxeq
k
` ci,epxe ` kq
ď1 xi,ec
1
i,epxe ` kq ` ci,epxe ` kq
ď2 xi,epc
1
i,epxeq ` kLq ` ci,epxeq ` kL
“ xi,ec
1
i,epxeq ` ci,epxeq ` pxi,e ` 1qkL
ď µi,epxq ` kLpδ ` 1q,
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where δ :“ maxiPNtdiu. Inequality ď1 holds as ci,e is convex and increasing, which implies
c1i,epxe ` kq ě pci,epxe ` kq ´ ci,epxeqq{k. We obtain inequality ď2 using Lipschitz constant
L, as it implies ci,epxe ` kq ď ci,epxeq ` kL and c
1
i,epxe ` kq ď c
1
i,epxeq ` kL. The second
inequality can be obtained in a similar way.
Lemma 3.3. Given an atomic splittable congestion game G, and a packet size k such that
ρipUq{k P N for all U Ď E and all i P N . Let xi P P
k
i pdiq be a strategy for player i in a
k-integral game. Then, if there exists an α ą 0 such that xi ` αpχf ´ χeq P Pipdiq, it holds
that µi,f pxkq ´ µi,epxkq ě ´2kǫLpδ ` 1q.
Proof. Lemma 3.1 states that µ´ki,e pxkq ď µ
`k
i,f pxkq. As xi ` αpχf ´ χeq P Pipdiq, we have
xi,e ą 0. We combine this with Lemma 3.2 to obtain that:
µi,epxkq ´ kLpδ ` 1q ď
1
k
µ´ki,e pxkq ď
1
k
µ`ki,f pxkq ď µi,f pxkq ` kLpδ ` 1q.
We rewrite the previous inequality, and obtain the desired statement:
µi,f pxkq ´ µi,epxkq ě ´2kLpδ ` 1q.
3.2 Atomic Splittable and k-Integral Equilibria
In this section we focus on finding ǫ-approximate equilibria for atomic splittable congestion
games with increasing, non-negative, differentiable and convex cost functions, where both
the original function and its derivative are bounded by Lipschitz constant L. In order to
do so, for each ǫ ą 0 we define a kǫ, and prove that the kǫ-integral equilibrium will be an
ǫ-approximate atomic splittable equilibrium.
Theorem 3.4. Given an atomic splittable game G, where all cost functions and their deriva-
tives are bounded by a Lipschitz constant L. Then, for any ǫ ą 0, there exists a kǫ ą 0 such
that an exact equilibrium x for the kǫ-integral splittable game Gkǫ is an ǫ-equilibrium for G.
Proof. As πi is convex, for any alternative strategy yi P Pipdiq, we have that:
πipyi, x´iq ě πipxi, x´iq `∇iπipxi, x´iq ¨ pyi ´ xiq. (3)
Thus, our goal is to determine a kǫ that bounds ∇iπipxi, x´iq ¨ pyi ´ xiq from below by ǫ.
We define Ei,` :“ te P E|yi,e ą xi,eu and E
i,´
:“ te P E|xi,e ą yi,eu. Note that:
∇iπipxi, x´iq ¨ pyi ´ xiq “
ÿ
ePEi,`
µi,epxqpyi,e ´ xi,eq `
ÿ
ePEi,´
µi,epxqpyi,e ´ xi,eq. (4)
Consider the complete, directed, bipartite graph Gpxi, yiq on node sets E
i,´ and Ei,`,
where each node e P Ei,´ has a supply of xi,e´yi,e and each node e P E
i,` has a demand of
yi,e´xi,e. The edges of Gpxi, yiq are directed from E
i,´ to Ei,` and the capacity ce,f pxi, yiq
of edge e, f P Ei,´ ˆ Ei,` is defined as:
ce,f pxi, yiq “ maxtα|xi ` αpχf ´ χeq P Pipdiqu.
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Then, as yi and xi are points in the polymatroid base polytope Pipdiq, there exists a
transshipment t in Gpxi, yiq from resources in E
i,´ to resources in Ei,` that exactly satisfies
all supplies, demands and capacities (Lemma 3.2 [14]). We denote by te,f the amount of
load transshipped from resource e to resource f in t, thus:
ř
fPEi,` te,f “ xi,e ´ yi,e if
e P Ei,´ and
ř
fPEi,´ tf,e “ yi,e ´ xi,e if e P E
i,` Using this transshipment, we rewrite (4)
in terms of t. Hence,
∇iπipxi, x´iq ¨ pyi ´ xiq
“
ÿ
ePEi,`
µi,epxqpyi,e ´ xi,eq `
ÿ
ePEi,´
µi,epxqpyi,e ´ xi,eq
“
ÿ
ePEi,`
µi,epxq
¨
˝ ÿ
fPEi,´
tf,e
˛
‚´ ÿ
ePEi,´
µi,epxq
¨
˝ ÿ
fPEi,`
te,f
˛
‚
“
ÿ
f,ePEi,´ˆEi,`
µi,epxqtf,e ´
ÿ
e,fPEi,´ˆEi,`
µi,epxqte,f
“
ÿ
e,fPEi,´ˆEi,`
µi,fpxqte,f ´
ÿ
e,fPEi,´ˆEi,`
µi,epxqte,f
“
ÿ
e,fPEi,´ˆEi,`
pµi,f pxq ´ µi,epxqqte,f . (5)
Note that, in order to use Lemma 3.3, we need a packet size k such that ρipUq{k P N for all
U Ď E and all i P N . Note that ρipUq P Qě0 for all U Ď E and all i P N , hence, we define
ρgcd :“ maxta P Qą0 | a ď 1 and @i P N,U Ď E, Dℓ P N such that ρipUq “ a ¨ ℓu.
Given any ǫ ą 0, we define
kǫ “
ρgcdQ
2m2Lδpδ`1q
ǫ
U . (6)
Note that kǫ has the following two properties: (1) As ρgcd ď 1, we know that kǫ ď
ǫ
2m2Lδpδ`1q
; (2) As ρgcd{kǫ P N, we know that ρipUq{kǫ P N for all U Ď E and all i P N .
We prove that the kǫ-integral equilibrium is also an ǫ-approximate equilibrium for the
corresponding atomic splittable game. Using Lemma 3.3, we know that if there exists an
α ą 0 such that: xi ` αpχf ´ χeq P Pipdiq, we have that:
µi,f pxq ´ µi,epxq ě ´2kǫLpδ ` 1q ě ´
ǫ
m2δ
. (7)
By the choice of transshipment t, we have that xi ` te,f pχf ´ χeq P Pipdiq. We combine
Equation (7) with Equation (5) and obtain:
∇iπipxi, x´iq ¨ pyi ´ xiq ě ´
¨
˝ ÿ
e,fPEi,´ˆEi,`
ǫ
m2δ
te,f
˛
‚. (8)
Note that te,f ď δ and |E
i,´ ˆ Ei,`| ă m2. Hence: ∇iπipxi, x´iq ¨ pyi ´ xiq ą ´ǫ. Using
Equation (3) we obtain: πipyi, x´iq ą πipxi, x´iq ´ ǫ. Thus, player i cannot gain more
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than ǫ by playing an alternative strategy yi. As player i was chosen arbitrarily, x is an
ǫ-approximate equilibrium.
Corollary 3.5. Given an atomic splittable singleton game, where the cost functions are
non-negative, increasing, differentiable, convex, and where both the original function as its
derivative are bounded by a Lipschitz constant, we can compute an ǫ-approximate equilibrium
within a running time
O
˜
nm
ˆ
δ
ρgcd
R
2m2Lδpδ ` 1q
ǫ
V˙3¸
.
Proof. Assume we are given ǫ ą 0. Using Theorem 3.4, we can then find a packet size
kǫ such that for any k ď kǫ, any k-splittable equilibrium is an ǫ-approximate equilibrium.
Using the Algorithm [10, Algorithm 1] by Harks, Peis and Klimm, we can compute a k-
splittable equilibrium within running time Opnmpδ{kq3q. Thus, using the definition of kǫ
in (6), we can find ǫ-approximate equilibria within the required running time.
4 Multimarket Cournot Oligopoly
In this last section, we derive a strong connection between atomic splittable singleton
congestion games with convex cost functions and multimarket Cournot oligopolies with
concave, decreasing and differentiable price functions and quadratic costs. Such a game is
compactly represented by the tupleM “ pN,E, pEiqiPN , ppi,eqiPN,ePEi , pCiqiPN q, where N is
a set of n firms and E a set of m markets. Each firm i only has access to a subset Ei Ď E of
the markets and each market e is endowed with firm-specific, non-increasing, differentiable
and concave price functions pi,eptq : RÑ R, for all i P N . In a strategy profile, a firm i P N
chooses a non-negative production quantity xi,e P Rě0 for each market e P Ei. We denote
a strategy profile for a firm by xi “ pxi,eqePEi , and a joint strategy profile by x “ pxiqiPN .
The production costs of a firm are of the form Ciptq “ cit
2 for some ci ě 0. The goal of
each firm i P N is to maximize its utility, which is given by:
uipxq “
ÿ
ePEi
pi,epxeqxi,e ´Ci
´ ÿ
ePEi
xi,e
¯
,
where xe :“
ř
iPN xi,e. Note that a connection between Cournot games with affine price
functions and atomic splittable games with affine cost functions has already been made
in [12]. In the rest of this section we generalize the connection stated in [12] and prove
that several results that hold for atomic splittable equilibria and k-splittable equilibria in
games with convex cost functions carry over to multimarket oligopolies with concave price
functions.
Both multimarket oligopolies and atomic splittable congestion games are strategic games.
A strategic game G “ pN, pXqiPN , puiqi P Nq is defined by a set of players N , a set of
feasible strategies Xi for each player i P N and a pay-off function uipxq for each i P N ,
where x P
Ś
iPN Xi. Let G “ pN, pXiqiPN , puiqi P Nq and H “ pN, pYiqiPN , pviqi P Nq be
two strategic games with identical player set N . Then, G and H are called isomorphic,
if for all i P N there exists a bijective function φi : Xi Ñ Yi and Ai P R such that
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uipx1, . . . xnq “ νipφ1px1q, . . . , φnpxnqq ` Ai. Then, pxiqiPN is an equilibrium of game G if
and only if pφipxiqqiPN is an equilibrium of game H. This implies that pxiqiPN is the unique
equilibrium of game G if and only if pφipxiqqiPN is the unique equilibrium of game H.
Theorem 4.1. Given a multimarket oligopoly M with concave, decreasing and differen-
tiable price functions and quadratic costs, one can construct an atomic splittable game G
with convex, increasing and differentiable costs that is isomorphic to M within polynomial
time.
Proof. This proof generalizes a similar transformation stated in [12, Theorem 7.2]. Given
multimarket oligopoly M, we construct an atomic splittable singleton game G as follows.
For every firm i P N we create a player i and we define the demand di for this player as an
upper bound on the maximal quantity that firm i will produce, that is, di :“
ř
ePEi
maxtt |
pi,eptq “ 0u. Then, for every player i we introduce a special resource ei, and we define the set
of allowable resources for this player as: E˜i “ EiY teiu with ei ‰ ej for i ‰ j. The cost on
these special resources ei are defined as: ci,eiptq :“ cipt´ 2diq for all i P N , which are affine
and increasing, and hence differentiable, convex and Lipschitz continuous with Lipschitz
constant ci. The cost on resources e P Ei are defined as ci,eptq :“ ´pi,eptq for all i P N . Note
that all cost functions are Lipschitz continuous with constant L1 :“ maxttLu Y tciuiPNu.
In order to guarantee that all cost functions are non-negative, one can add a large positive
constant C to every cost function. Note that adding C to every cost function does not
change the equilibrium, it only adds Cdi to the total cost of each player. For each i P N ,
we define the bijective function φi : Ei Ñ E˜ as:
φipxi,1, . . . , xi,mq “ pxi,1, . . . , xi,m, di ´
ř
ePEi
xi,eq “: px
1
i,1, . . . , x
1
i,m, x
1
i,m`1q.
One can check that the revenue uippxiqiPN q for player i inM equals the cost πippφipxiqqiPN
of i in G minus a constant. Thus, game M and G are isomorphic.
As we are able to construct ǫ-approximate equilibria within pseudo-polynomial time, The-
orem 4.1 implies the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2. Given a multimarket oligopoly M, where all cost functions are Lipschitz
continuous with Lipschitz constant L, one can compute an ǫ approximate equilibrium within
a running time that is pseudo-polynomial in L, maxtdi | i P Nu and
1
ǫ
.
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